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ABSTRACT
Two alternative trading mechanisms for securities markets are compared using laboratory ex-
perimentation and computer simulation. One mechanism is the floor-based specialist auction in place
in most U.S. stock exchanges today, and the other is an electronic alternative employing automatic
order matching. We conclude that transition from the established floor-based exchanges to potentially
superior electronic alternatives is possible, despite the inertia resulting from the experience of benefits
investors trading in active markets, and that current proposals for electronic markets are not demons-
trably superior on generally accepted criteria used to assess market quality.
This has clear implications for established stock exchanges, market regulators, and vendors of electronic
trading systems.
1. INTRODUCTION matching systems. The principal proponent of the tradi-
tional trading floor has been the US, where the best known
1.1 Overview of the Paper example is theNYSE. Electronic enhancements to existing
markets were pioneered in the United States in the over-
There is considerable confusion concerning the potential the-counter market's NASDAQ system. The most preva-
impact of electronic alternatives to traditional, established, lent form of electronic trading automatic order matching
floor-based stock markets, such as the New York Stock (described below), was pioneered in the Toronto Stock
Exchange (NYSE). There are unresolved research issues Exchange, in their CATS (Computer Assisted Trading
in finance about which market mechanism is superior (Beja System), and variants are currently employed in the Tokyo
and Hakansson 1979; Cohen et al. 1986): Information Stock Exchange, the Paris Bourse, and numerous ex-
technology creates a range of new possibilities for the or- changes and bourses throughout Europe.
ganization of securities trading (Garbade and Silber 1978;
Schwartz 1988), yet research techniques are not fully Customers may submit either limit onien, requests to buy
developed for identifying the consequences of implemen- or sell a specified quantity at a specified price, or maiket
ting such major information systems. A worrisome o,de,s, requests to buy or sell a specified q,tantity immedi-
possibility exists that a new electronic market may be ately at the best price currently available in the market.
preferable and socially desirable, but that no feasible Limit orders are placed in a limit order book in price and
transition path exists from the entrenched market to this time priority - the higher the bid price the customer is
alternative; in this case, regulation may be needed to effect willing to pay to buy, the higher the order's priority in the
a transition from one trading arena to another. These are book, and the lower the ask price the customer demands
issues with considerable significance to regulators, securi- for his shares, the higher the order's priority, equal bids
ties markets, and financial services firms. Through ex- and equal asks are put in FIFO order. Market orders to
perimental economics and detailed computer simulation, buy will execute against the best ask in the book; market
we resolve some of these research issues. Equally impor- orders to sell will execute against the best bid in the book.
tant, the techniques developed are applicable to evaluating Limit orders will attempt to match orders already in the
a wide range of strategic systems, with uncertain adoption, book: if an investor is willing to bid at a price equal to or
and thus uncertain benefits. higher than the best ask, the two orders will execute at the
ask price, and if an investor is asking a price lower than or
1.2 The Problem equal to the best bid, the orders will execute at the bid
price; otherwise the new limit order is added to the book.
There has been an ongoing debate for over a decade
concerning the relative merits of floor-based exchanges Specialht Markets: US style stock exchanges feature a
compared to high technology disintermediated order specialist, a market-maker on the floor of the exchange
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charged with making a fair and orderly market in an Hl: A transition from a floor-based specialist market to an
individual stock. The specialist provides his own quotes at automatic order matching system is feasible.
all times, which may or may not be the best bid and offer
on the book; at times there may be no customer bids or H2: Automatic order matching systems are preferable to
offers, but the specialist must always have his own quotes specialist markets.
in the book. A key aspect of the specialist's role is
#imiatiw, obligalimi; that is, the specialist nud buy Traders who take their orders to a new, less active, and
stocks when there are no customer orders to buy and mid less liqui& market face economic penalties. The first is
se# when there are no customer orders to sell. When uncertain execution: in the absence of significant order
doing so, the specialist both stabilizes price changes in the flow, it is uncertain when their orders will actually execute.
market and provides immediacy to customers; market Additionally, they face a liquidity penalty. attempts to sell
order customers are assured that they will be able to buy in an inactive market will naturally create an imbalance,
or sell without waiting for other customers' orders to depressing the price and damaging the attempted seller,
arrive. and attempts to buy will create an imbalance and iraise the
price. This advantage of established markets is called the
Azinwn,#ir Oider Matching S*ems: A market based on liquidity Alp or cen£ral ma,ket *fense, and explains why,
fully automatic order matching has no specialists, and no in general order flow attracts order flow (Cohen et al.
party with affirmative obligation. Securities firms, trading 1986). Liquidity is the single most important criterion
for customers and for their own accounts, enter orders into market professionals cite when selecting among alternative
an electronic dealing system, where they are usually markets for an instrument (Cohen and Schwartz 1988).
displayed on trading screens; orders to buy or sell at an Traders thus face a coordination game: even if the trading
attractive price may well be expected to attract additional mechanism of the new market is more attractive than the
offers to trade against them. Orders to buy and sell match established market, it may be difficult to induce enough
if they are for the same price, and in these systems orders traders to switch. The reduction in service cost in the new
transact only against other orders. Despite the prevalence market may not be sufficient to compensate early adopters
of manual trading in major stock markets, there appear to for the penalties of inferior execution caused by the
be several advantages to automated trading. Screen-based liquidity penalty.
trading systems can become 24-hour global markets.
There is no specialist acting as intermediary, buying cus- Independent of whether transition is possible, it remains to
tomers' shares to resell to other customers, and thus no be established whether automatic order matching systems
need for investors to pay specialist commissions or to bear truly offer customers superior execution. This will enable
the difference between the specialists' buying and selling us to consider whether adoption of these systems is
prices. Systems such as Instinet charge one cent per share desirable. Standard measures of market quality employed
commission, compared to about ten cents per share for in the finance literature will be used (e.g., Cohen and
trades executed on the NYSE. In addition there are Schwartz 1988):
surveillance and regulatory advantages to trading systems
that provide an electronic audit trail. 1.4 Significance of the Research
The question of whether to move from specialist markets This work is significant to various stakeholders, including
to automatic trading systems is hotly debated.2 There is an exchanges regulators, and trading systems developers. It
emotional issue of privilege and fairness - the specialist suggests strategies that developers can use to capture
has preferred access to information about orders in the market share from established exchanges, and defenses
book, which enables him to trade more intelligently; since with which these exchanges can counter.
the specialist sees the entire book, and traders off the floor
do not, the specialist can sense when buy or sell pressure The relative merits of traditional markets and electronic
is building, and can exploit this information when setting alternatives remains a complex unresolved issue in finance.
his quotes. This preferred access is a form of compensa- There have been numerous suggestions for disintermedi-
tion for his affirmative obligation. Some parties have seen ated electronic markets (Amihud and Mendelson 1988;
preferred access to order flow information as providing an Amihud, Ho and Schwartz 1985; Black 1971; Peake,
unjustified trading advantage. Of more fundamental Mendelson and Williams 1989). Since the desirability of
importance than the emotional issue should be a matter of these markets has not been established analytically, there
economic eficiency or social welfare: is the specialist have been suggestions for parallel operation, allowing
worth his cost? Is the service provided sufficientlyvaluable investors to decide through their selection of markets for
to justify the specialists' trading profits and commissions? their orders which market will become more liquid
(Amihud and Mendelson 1988; Amihud, Ho and Schwartz
1985; Black 1971). Questions of transition among markets,
1.3 The Research Issues involving dynamic behavior rather than equilibrium
analysis, have proven quite intractable to traditional
Our research has addressed two hypotheses: analytical tools of finance research.
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It is the contribution to MIS research, especially to nism be sumcient to overcome the strategic uncertainty
evaluating the potential impact of proposed strategic about liquidi(y in a new market7 Unless a computerized
systems, that originally attracted us to this research. There trading mechanism can attract sufficient trading volume, it
is evidence that executives struggle to make technology in- will remain unattractive to traders. This appears to have
vestment decisions, particularly when the evaluation been a problem with many automated tradingmechanisms.
requires determining the impact of an innovative and As Schwartz (1988) noted, "major traders in the equity
potentially strategic application of information technology markets are reluctant to enter orders in a computerized
(Clemons 1991; Clemons and Weber 199Ob; Pool 1983). market system." Ariel, Autex, NSTS/Cincinnati, and Intex
It is difficult to estimate the future benefits of strategic sys- are examples of computerized trading systems that failed
tems, when there is great uncertainty in marketplace to have the expected impacts (Schwartz 1988). In other
response, and when the benefits are largely determined by cases, transitions to a new trading market have succeeded:
this response. There are natural extensions to evaluating Eurobonds moved from NYC to London in 1963 and
impact of, and marketplace response to, more complex Swedish share trading moved to London after 1986.6
systems operating in less stylized markets.
Because the greatest uncertaintyin evaluating the adoption
2. EXPERIMENTAL METHODOLOGIES of electronic trading alternatives comes from attempting to
predict the responses of market participants, we create a
Recently, laboratory experiments have become recognized laboratory experiment to examine their choices of markets
as a useful valid way to test economic behavior and for their orders. In these experiments, subjects' trading
theories (Smith 1982). Data from real markets may be decisions determine the liquidityof two alternative markets
influenced by a range of seen and unseen factors that do and hence the prices at which trades occur. Initially, one
not allow the direct testing of traders' choices among market is made more attractive than the other, allowing it
markets for their orders. Analytic models of trader choice, to capture a majority of trading volume. At the experi-
when there are transactions costs and multiple markets are ment's mid-point, the less liquid market is given cost
available, do not lead to a unique prediction of traders' advantages similar to those evident for electronic trading.
behavior. Multiple outcomes may each represent stable Development of liquidity in the new, now advantageous
equilibria (Economides and Siow 1988; Pagano 1989). We market, if it occurs, will be the result of traders' choices,
can determine experimentally which of the available which will in turn depend on traders expectations for the
equilibria is most likely to occur, and can thereby gain liquidity of the new trading alternative.
insight into the dynamics of trading volume transitions
among competing markets. 3.1 Experimental Design
Wc use simulation to extend analytical work done by The reward structure for experimental subjects reflects
Demsetz (1968), Ho and Macris (1985), Mendelson (1987), gains from coordination and the possibilityof lower profits,
and others, examining the relative performance of different or even losses, from adverse order imbalances and market
market structures. In previous analytical research, deri- imquidity.7 In the two markets, supply and demand are
vations of market differences are kept tractable by making created endogenously, based on the subjects' submission of
several restrictive assumptions. The results provide orders. Subjects have either an order to buy or an order
significant insight into the determinants of market quality to sell a certain number of shares in each period. Subjects
for the market structures examined, but often abstract divide orders across the two markets as he or she feels is
away the specific details that we are attempting to exam- best. After orders have been submitted, traders' earnings
ine. For example, in actual markets the specialist faces are based on the balance of buying and selling interest in
competition from the limit orders of public investors, and each market, and on the size of each market.8 The best
a simulation that examines the performance of market- outcome is for all traders to direct their orders to same
makers without competition from investors will not enable market, and when the trading costs differ in the two
us to determine the actual cost to investors implicit in this markets, to trade in the market with the lower cost.
competition. Simulation has yielded useful results in
market microstructure research, in particular for examining The experiment had two parts. In Part 1, traders divided
phenomena for which tractable analytical modeling is not their orders across two markets with the same earnings
yet possible. We use simulation modeling to accommo- functions. Orders submitted to Market X were assured
date a wide range of assumptions and to retain details of execution and had profits and losses determined, based on
actual market mechanismsthat maystronglyinfluence their orders actually submitted, according to the function given
transactional characteristics and performance. below. Market Y, however, was characterized by uncertain
execution similar to that encountered in a direct search
3. AN EXPERIMENTAL TEST OF market, in which buyers and sellers must attempt to locate
MARKET TRANSITIONS each other. In Part 1, after subjects made their trading
choices, a stochastic element was introduced. The results
The principal question we address in the experiments is of a random event determined whether or not trading
can the cost advantages of an alternative trading mecha- occurred in Market Y. If trading occurre.,4 then profits
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were calculated normally; if trading did not occur, then traders from New York Stock Exchange specialist firms,
subjects earned no profits on orders submitted to Market one morning before the Open, to determine if the behavior
Y. In all experiments, by the end of Part 1, Market X of our student experimental subjects was consistent with
emerged as the dominant, more liquid market. that of experienced market professionals. The experimen-
tai outcomes were similar.
In Part 2 of the experiment, advantageous technological
improvements were ascribed to Market Y, which as a There are three competing predictions of the outcome of
result was now able to offer assured execution and to the trader choices among different competing markets.
impose lower transactions costs. Traders were still per- First, if trades attract trades, we expect the established
mitted to divide their orders among markets. market to remain dominant. Second, symmetric rational
expectations" predict immediate transition to the more
Payoffs for market participants are determined as follows: advantageous market (Muth 1961). Third, adaptive
First D is calculated for each market, where D is the learning (Camerer 1990; Lucas 1986) implies that with suf-
absolute value of the share imbalance, the difference ficient incentive traders will be persistent in their use of the
between orders submitted to buy and orders submitted to new market, even when initial use is not always rewarded
sell in each market. Traders on the stronger side of the financially; other traders will observe this and reduce their
market (i.e., buyers when there are more buy orders than uncertainty concerning market liquidity; and there will be
sell orders in the market, or sellers when there are more a gradual trend toward the market now offering superior
sell orders than buys) are rewarded according to the transactions costs. Ultimately, this market will capture suf-
following payoff function: ficient order flow to offer superior execution as well, and
the dominance of the new trading systems will emerge as
Strong-Side Profit per Share = a stable new equilibrium.
10¢ - (K,t, * D) / Total Share Orders Submitted
Our results consistently supported this third prediction.
Traders on the weaker side of the market instead receive: There is a significant trend toward the lower-cost market
after its introduction of technological improvements. An
Weak-Side Profit per Share = illustrative graph, demonstrating the division of orders
10¢ + (K™a * D) / Total Shaie Orders Submitted among competing markets during both phases of a single
experiment, is provided in Figure 1. In Part 1 of the
Knrong and Kw-k are coefficients (in units of cents) that experiment, the market share of X varied but was usually
relate profits to the ratio of market imbalance divided by greater than 50%. In Part 2 of the experiment, there was
the size of the market. In the experiment, K,t: :,g was set a persistent decline in X's share, leading to its eventual
higher than La• That is, the penalty for trading in the extinction; superimposed over the graph ofX's actual share
illiquid market, when there were few orders against which is a smoothed curve fitted to this data.
your order could trade, was greater than the rewards for
trading in the illiquid market when there were few orders We use a model of market adoption based on exponential
to compete with yours: To compute the payoff in the decay of the established market:
technologically improved Market Y in Part 2 it is necessary
only to add a small amount to the payoff function defined MarketShareMAY = Ae-Bt
for Part 1, reflecting the reduced transactions costs of the
improved market. In some replications of the experiment, Models are derived in ordinary least squares regression of
four cents were added, increasing expected earning by 40% the form
for equivalent order submissions, to see how traders
responded to a large relative cost savings; in other replica- Log(MarketShareladY) = toi;A + (-BO
tions, 1¢ was added, increasing expected earnings by 10%.
The actual supporting data arc shown in Table 1.
3.2 Experimental Procedures
The model is significant at the .01 level in all four of the
Experimental participants were volunteers recruited from cases when the new market offered the larger advantage,
undergraduate classes in management, decision science, and at the.10 level in 2 of the 3 cases when the relative
and finance at the University of Pennsylvania. Eight advantage was smaller. Also, when the smaller advantage
subjects were assigned in equal numbers to be buyers or was offered, transition was considerably slower.
sellers. Instructions were read aloud and subjects worked
through two trading examples that demonstrated their We find transitions appearfeasible and are best explained
understanding of the choices open to them and of their by traders' adaptation to feedback from the prior period's
payoff functions. Profits per round ranged from a fifty cent outcome. In addition, comparing transitions observed with
loss to a $1.50 gain, and experimental subjects each earned differing transactions costs improvements allows us to
between $12.00 and $24.00 during the two hour experiment. determine that the size of the new market's advantage
An additional experiment was conducted using senior influences the transition likelihood and speed.
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MARKET SHARE OF MARKET X
Experiment 2
100%
Market X's Share of
80% - Total Trading Volume
1 Competing Market Y
60%- "Technologically Enhanced'
40% -
Fitted Exponential
Decay Model
20% -
0%1111'11'11111
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 101112
Part 1 Part 2
PERIOD NUMBER
Figure 1. Market Share or Market X in Typical Experiment
Market share of Market X varies in Part 1 of the experiment, as subjects vary the portion of their orders that they direct toward each market.
Market X generally has the dominant market share. In Part 2, when Market Y is given a significant cost advantage, Market X's share begins a
steady exponential decline.
Table 1. Time Series Analysis: Transitions of Trading Activity
The data on transitions from dominant Market X to technologically superior Market Y are fit to an exponential decay curve for the market share
of Market X. All four experiments with a large cost advantage are statistically significant a.t the.01 level. Transitions with a smaller cost advantage
are more problematic, but do occur. Dominant market share is considered to be 85% or greater.
coem- Durbin- No. Periods until
Cost Advantage of dents t- Watson Alternative Market
Experiment Alternative Market A B R2 Statistic Statistic is Dominant
1 40% .373 .086 52.4% 2.97# 964&1 11
2 40% 306 .203 90.7% 9.38# 1.75 6
3 40% .384 .077 663% 4.46# 108@ 13
4 40% .408 .044 52.2% 3.30# 1.55 23
5 10% Not Significant 2.7% .052
6 10% 300 .047 56.2% 358# 3.08 2 26
7 10% 304 .030 24.0% 1.78* 1.80@ 41
T 40% .491 .081 22.6% 0.94** - 15
# = Significant at.01 level
= Significant at .10 level
- = Significant at .20 level
@= Cannot reject null hypothesis of nonautocorrelated residuals at .05 significance level
&1 = Reject null hypothesis of nonautocorrelated residuals in favor of positive first-order autocorrelation
&2 = Reject null hypothesis of nonautocorrelated residuals in favor of negative first-order autocorrelation
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4. SIMULATIONS TO COMPARE ALTERNATIVE - When the specialist acquires a position more than
MARKET DESIGNS six units long of the security, the specialist's bid
and offer quotes are lowered by an eighth; a short
position of more than six units leads the specialist
4.1 Design of the Simulation to raise bid and offer quotes by an eighth.
The simulations compared two different designs for - When the arrival of investors' limit orders makes
equities markets. The first design is a disintermediated the book measurably "thick" on the bid side (and
order matching market similar to the CATS trading system thus more competitive with the specialist), the
in use at the Toronto Stock Exchange and several other specialist will raise his bid quote by an eighth;
stock markets. The second is based on the dominant when the book on the ask side is thick, the
structure for securities trading in the US, a specialist-led specialist's ask is lowered by an eighth. A 'thin"
floor auction market. book leads the specialist either to lower his bid orraise his ask.
In simulation models of these two designs, common
assumptions are made about the arrival process of inves- • The specialist's trading policies result in positive
tors' orders, order placement strategy, price volatility, and trading profits for the simulation period; this entails:
the proportions of market and limit orders. Differences in
the two market structures lead to performance characteris- - adjusting bid and ask quotes as described and
tics that are compared under controlled trading conditions.
A factorial experimental design permits controlled compar- - setting the initial spread between their bid and
isons of the two market architectures using three levels of ask quotes depending on trading conditions:
order arrival rates, four levels of equilibrium price volati- a wider spread for higher price volatility and
lity, and three levels of ratio of market to limit orders. a higher proportion of limit orders, and a
Based on six measures of market quality, we assess the narrower spread for more frequent order
relative attractiveness of the alternative designs for each of arrivals.
twenty-four sets of conditions. Because of space limita-
tions, only two critical measures will be addressed here; a
more complete treatment can be found in Weber (1991). 4.2 Simulation Results
Both markets were simulated with the following conditions Three predictions are available to assess the output of the
in common: simulations. First, electronic order matching systems
enhance market quality by eliminating the specialist's role
• Trading is continuous in time - that is, can occur at and returning specialists' profits to the investor commun-
any point in time during the hours the market is open ity. Second, specialists enhance market quality and provide
- and price and time priority are strictly followed.11 liquidity services that have value in excess of their cost to
investors. Third, the value of the specialist role is contin-
• An underlying equilibrium price for the security is gent on market conditions such as price volatility and
initially set to $33.00, and is assumed to follow a investors' use of limit orders.
random walk; this implicit equilibrium price is of
course not directly observable by market participants. We will focus here on two closely related measures of
market quality: market bid-ask spread and the round-trip
• Orders arrive based on a Poisson arrival process that cost of execution using market orders. The bid-ask spread
is dependent upon equilibrium price; at prices above is the measure most widely used in the finance community
the equilibrium price, sell orders become more likely, and is easy to assess analytically; our results are consistent
and below it, buy orders are more likely. with those derived in closed form (Stoll 1985). Round-trip
execution cost using market orders is the measure that
Essential market differences were also incorporated in the most accurately reflects the costs an individual retail
simulation: customer incurs in trading in the market. The two mea-
sures of market quality yield very similar quality compar-
• The floor-based market utilizes a specialist, who buys isons. Sample graphs of both quality measures, comparing
and sells for inventory. The specialist makes continu- both markets for varying levels of limit order percentages,
ous quotes for both buying and selling, and adjusts are shown in Figures 2 and 3. Under all market activity
these quotes to reflect current positions and trading conditions examined - high, average, and low - the specia-
conditions. list market had superior performance.
• The specialist has no advantageous information about The presence of a specialist is shown to reduce market
equilibrium price, and responds only to inventory and bid-ask spreads; it could hardly be otherwise, since the
order flow. specialist is not permitted to make the spread worse, and
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DECREASE IN AVERAGE MARKET SPREAD
Market Spread (as % of share price)
5% -
Order Matching
4% -
Order Matching
3% -
Order Matching
2% -
Specialist
1% - Specialist
Specialist Limit Order:
Market Order
, Ratio
0% 1 1 1--1.1 l i l i 10 1 1 1
1 1.5 2 3 1 1.5 2 3 1 1.5 2 3
Active Average Inactive
THREE TRADING ACTIVITY LEVELS
Figure 2. Decrease in Average Market Spread for Three Trading Activity Levels
as a Function of the Ratio or Market Orders to Limit Orders
Market spreads, for markets with and without a specialist, are compared for four different ratios of market orders to limit orders, using three
different sets of trading conditions that represent stocks that trade very actively, with average activity, and inactively. Under all conditions, the
presence of a specialist reduces spreads. The specialist's contribution to reducing spreads is greatest when the fraction of limit orders is lowest, and
decreases as use of limit orders increases.
if his quotes do not improve upon existing customer limit for two-thirds or more of arriving orders, or when volatili-
orders he will not trade and will earn no profits. Perhaps ty was highest.
more importantly, we showed that the cost of a round-trip
trade using market orders is lower even when the dealer
makes positive average profits, and average transaction- Advocates of electronic disintermediated markets suggest
to-transaction price change is less. Thus, a profitable that the widespread availability of information on all
dealer operation is consistent with improved market available orders will attract additional use of limit orders
quality. Electronic market designs that "disintermediate" by both opportunistic and patient investors. Our evidence
trading may not be in best interest of market participants. suggests that a dramatic increase in use of limit orders
We find that we can accept the second and third predic- would be required to replicate the benefits provided by the
tions. A non-parametric Mann-Whitney two-sample rank specialists' profitable behavior. Depending upon price
test indicates that the difference in the two markets' volatility and order arrival rates, an increase in limit order
average spreads are significant at the .01 level for twenty- utilization, ranging from an increase of 20% up to an
three of the twenty-four trading conditions studied. increase of 50%, would be required (Weber 1991); in the
Differences in the cost of a round-trip transaction are absence of the transactions costs advantage and access to
significantly lower for seventeen of the twenty-four trading orderflowinformation resulting from specialists'privileges,
conditions. The specialist was not significantly more it is uncertain that this additional use of limit orders will
beneficial for inactive trading when limit orders accounted materialize.
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DECREASE IN ROUND TRIP TRADING COSTS
Round Trip Costs (as % of share price)
,
Order Matching
3% -
Order Matching
Order Matching
2.5% -
2% - Specialiat
1.5% - -
1% - . Spec
ialist
Specialist
0.5% - Limit Order:
Market Order
Ratio
1 I l l 1 1 1 I
t# 1 1
0% 2 31 1.5 2 3 11.52311.5
Active Average Inactive
THREE TRADING ACTIVITY LEVELS
Figure 3. Decrease in the Average Cost or a Round-Trip Trade Using Market Orders for Three
Trading Activity Levels as a Function of the Ratio of Market Orders to Limit Orders
Average cost of a round-trip trade, using market orders, in markets with and without a specialist, is compared for four different ratios of market
orders to limit orders, using three different sets of trading conditions that represent stocks that trade very actively, with average activity, and inac-
tively. Under all conditions, the presence of a specialist reduces the cost of a round trip using market orders. The specialist's contribution to reduc-
ing this cost is greatest when the fraction of limit orders is lowest, and decreases as usc of limit ordeis increases.
43 Validation 5. CONCLUSIONS AND CONTRIBUTION
Considerable effort was made to validate assumptions used
in the simulation model. Actual exchange data on order 5.1 Implications for Stakeholders
arrivals were used to validate our assumption of Poisson
arrivals, using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. Similarly, data This research has implications for three major classes of
from the NYSE were used to set the ratio of limit and stakeholders affected by the prospects of electronic trading
market orders and the prices of these orders, and special- systems: regulators, established exchanges, and developers
ists from the NYSE validated our model of specialist of alternative trading systems.
behavior. Additionally, our results are derived under
conservative assumptions: in reality, the specialist does not The principal implication for regulators is that there is no
always make a profit, and he no longer has exclusive access need for them to take a proactive stance on market
to information in the order book. If specialists add value mechanism. We have confidence that the investor commu-
under these conditions, they will add value under more nity is capable of coordinated transition and will adopt
competitive conditions. Validation of the simulation is alternative trading mechanisms when they are demons-
treated in greater detail in Weber (1991). trably superior.
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The principal implication for established securities markets Partner, M. J. Meehan & Company and President of the
is that the central market defense cannot be relied upon NYSE Specialists Association; John J. Aarons, Head of
forever or under all circumstances. Again, when electronic Quality of Markets at the ISE; Dan Sheridan Director,
alternatives are financially preferable to investors, evidence Markets Supervision at the ISE, and Nigel Elwes, Finance
suggests that they will be adopted, and that liquidity will Director of S. G. Warburg Securities and Chairman of the
leave the established market. When the balance has tipped ISE's Domestic Equities Rules and Compliance Commit-
sufficiently for the previously dominant market to perceive tee, were extremely helpful in validating our models and
this as a problem it may already be too late to respond, as data and making certain that we understood the details of
the alternative will now offer both a transactions costs trading at major stock exchanges.
advantage and superior liquidity. This new equilibrium
should be stable, and attempts by the previously dominant George Hayter, in his position as Executive Director of the
market to recover share by matching the cost reductions International Stock Exchange, was, as always, of immeasur-
of the upstart will probably be unsuccessful. able assistance to us in our work.
Developers of alternative trading systems should take
comfort in the demonstration that the central market
defense is not insurmountable. However, significant 7. REFERENCES
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Journal OfFinance, Volume 33, Number 3, June 1978, pp.
819-831. 1. A mail mechanism is the means by which orders
submitted to a market are converted into completed
Ho, T., and Macris, R. "Dealer Market Structure and trades. Numerous mechanisms are possible, and many
Performance." In Y. Amihud, T. Ho, and R. Schwartz are in use in major markets today (Beja and Hakans-
(Eds), Market Making and the Changing Structure of son 1979). For example, some markets permit cus-
the Securities Indusby, Lexington, Massachusetts: tomer orders to interact with each other, while others
Lexington Books, 1985, pp. 41-66. require all customer orders to interact with interme-
diaries called nta,*ct-makeis, who buy shares that
Ho, T., and Stoll, H.R. "The Dynamics of Dealer Markets customers are selling or sell shares that customers
under Competition." Journal ofFinance, Volume 38, Sep- wish to buy; some have continuous trading while
tember 1983, pp. 1053-1072 others use periodic clearing of a batch of submitted
orders. Each will convert the same sequence of orders
Lucas, R. Jr. "Adaptive Behavior and Economic Theory." into a different set of trades.
Journal OfBusiness, Volume 59, Number 4, Part 2,1986,
pp. S401-S425. 2. Our research was inspired by our experience working
on a Congressional Office of Technology Assessment
Mendelson, H. "Consolidation, Fragmentation,andMarket Advisory Panel, examining electronic markets. The
Performnce: Journal of Financial and Quantitative OTA staff began the study with strong presumptions:
Ana(ysis, Volume 22, June 1987, pp. 189-207. that electronic disintermediated markets would be
better, since investors would no longer be providing
Muth, J. "Rational Expectations as a Theory of Price profits for intermediaries with their trades, and that
Movement." Economevica, July 1961, pp. 315-329. only venal self-interest of established power structures
at exchanges preserved roles of intermediaries. These
Pagano, M. "Trading Volume and Asset Liquidity." led to the belief of OTA staffers that investors were
Quatter* Journal of Economics, May 1989, pp. 255-274. trapped in archaic and expensive markets. These
initial assumptions require examination.
Peake, J.; Mendelson, M.; and Williams, R. Jr. "Black
Monday Market Structure and Market Making." In H. 3. Liquidity measures the ability to convert a security
Lucas, Jr. and R. Schwartz (Eds.), 77:e Challenge of readily into cash, or to convert cash into a security,
Information Technology for the Securities Markets: without excessive delay, and without undue price
Liquidi04 Volatih'ty, and Global Trading, Homewood, impact. In a liquid market, it will be easy to buy or
Illinois: Dow Jones-Irwin, 1989. sell a security, quickly, and at the current price. In an
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illiquid market, attempts to buy or sell will incur 8. In a typical market experiment, prices are determined
significant delay; moreover, attempts to buy will in an oral or computerized double auction in which
increase the price that must be paid, and attempts to subjects place and accept bids and offers. To save
sell will decrease the price received. time and permit a greater number of replications to be
performed, the auction mechanism is not included in
4. These include mmu grad between the best bid and our experiment. The factors that influence auction
ask, probability that a limit order executes, average price formation are instead included in the experi-
time until a limit order executes, average price change ment's earnings functions. There is little reason to
between consecutive transactions, average cost of a expect trader earningq arrived at through an auction
market round-trip using market orders (average cost to diverge from those that result from our experimen-
to buy and then sell using market orders), and average tal earningq functions. (Smith [1982] notes that
gain of a round-trip using limit orders. auctions converge to competitive equilibrium prices in
three to four tradingperiods.) The liquidityexternality
5. Ariel, a computerized block trading system started in in the market should be more prominent if the level
London in 1974, was closed due to lack of activity. of earnings from traders' quantity submissions is not
The Cincinnati Stock Exchange's National Securities confounded with their success in an auction.
Trading System @ISTS) was expected to become the
basis for an automated national stock exchange. Autex 9. This is quite plausible, given the reward structure of
is a system in the US that enables block traders to many traders, especially fund managers. A fund
indicate their trading interests. Intex is a Bermuda- manager who outperforms the market receives a
based automated futures exchange. None is widely bonus; a fund manager who under-performs the
used. market is frequently terminated.
6. Shortly after London introduced improved trading 10. In other words, traders know that it is beneficial if they
technology in its October 1986 Big Bang deregulation all move to the new market, they all know that all
of the stock exchange, Sweden doubled the trading tax other traders know, and they all know therefore that
imposed on securities transactions. The result was a moving to the new market will maximize their ex-
rapid movement of as much as 85% of the trading in pected earnings. Moreover, this move will be stable
key Swedish stocks off the Stockholm Stock Exchange and self-reinforcing since all know that a trader who
and onto London's International Stock Exchange defects will incur both higher transactions costs and
(Clemons and Weber 1990a). the penalty of trading in a less liquid market.
7. The experiment uses market size as a proxy for 11. Trades are executed in sequence, with the highest "bit"
liquidity, since liquidity is an elusive concept and price to buy and lowest "ask" price to sell having
difficult to measure notion. In general thinly traded priority. Among competing orders at the same price,
securities are considered less liquid, and larger and the earliest order has priority.
more active markets are considered more liquid; we
adopt this convention.
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